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Erickson and Strange: China’s Blue Soft Power

CHINA’S BLUE SOF T POWER
Antipiracy, Engagement, and Image Enhancement
Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange

O

n 3 September 2014, almost six years since Chinese warships first entered
the Gulf of Aden to fulfill antipiracy duties, China Central Television
(CCTV)–8 aired the first episode of “In the Gulf of Aden” (舰在亚丁湾).1 The
multidozen-episode program, designed to “ignite raging patriotism” (燃起熊
熊爱国心), given evening prime-time status, and attracting a popular audience with a star-studded cast, explores in dramatic fashion Beijing’s experience
Dr. Erickson is associate professor in the China fighting modern piracy. Produced by the People’s
Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), in the Strategic
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political DepartResearch Department of the Naval War College,
ment’s Television Art Center (海军政治部电视艺
Newport, Rhode Island; an associate in research at
the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Stud- 术中心) over three years, the series offers a unique
ies, Harvard University; and a term member of the window into how the PLAN has conducted its
Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author, coantipiracy mission and seeks to portray its experiauthor, or coeditor of, recently, A Low-Visibility
Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile ence to a Chinese audience.
Ambitions (2014), Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing
In the first episode’s action-packed beginand Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (2014),
Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Development ning, PLAN Vessel 168 deploys special forces by
(2013), Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf
helicopter to repel Somali pirates boarding the
of Aden (2013), and Chinese Mine Warfare (2009).
crippled China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
Mr. Strange is a PhD student studying international
vessel Zhanshan. Meanwhile, Electro-Mechanical
relations in Harvard University’s Department of
Branch squad leader Sun Weimin helps fix the
Government. His work mainly focuses on China and
its presence in the international system, particularly
ship’s stalled engine, enabling it to rejoin the esin the fields of international security, politics, and
cort formation.2 Political commissar Xiao Weiguo
development. He previously studied at Zhejiang Unisubsequently grants Sun a twenty-minute phone
versity (MS); Peking University and Tsinghua University; and the College of William and Mary (BA).
call home—twice his previous allocation. Later
Strange has also worked as a researcher at CMSI.
episodes intersperse the glories of Gulf of Aden
operations with the privations of being away from
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families, who are separated from service members by thousands of miles and
by limitations in information transmission.3 Gripping scenes portray PLAN
personnel constantly checking food quality, averting phytosanitary disaster by
switching in-port suppliers, refueling under way, weathering storms, exercising
with foreign navies and receiving their officers aboard, adjusting plans rapidly to
handle unexpected challenges, using special weapons and techniques to dispel
pirates nonlethally, saving wounded merchant seamen with emergency medical
treatment, and receiving gratitude from domestic and foreign ships they protect.
While some aspects of helicopter operations, weapons firing, and special
forces engagement with pirates appear embellished for cinematic effect, the series
uses real PLAN personnel and PLAN and civilian ships.4 Many details match
realistic documentation in China’s state and military media. Human experiences
are personified uniquely—as when a PLAN marine, Fang Xiaoba, pays respects
at the grave of his father, who died rendering medical assistance in Tanzania—but
collectively represent actual struggles and triumphs of sailors and families. A few
scenarios exceed actual events to date. Most prominently, on a small forested
island off Somalia, Team Leader Mao Dahua leads his special forces in a sixteenhour battle replete with exchanges of fire to evacuate thirteen Taiwanese fishermen cornered by pirates.5 Yet such heroics are not utterly fanciful and might well
foreshadow future PLAN operations.
Beyond simply serving as a blockbuster image engaging domestic dreams of a
strong military, however, since 2008 China’s antipiracy escorts have provided important soft-power benefits for Beijing on a truly international stage. For the first
time in its modern history China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond
its immediate maritime periphery for extended durations, to protect merchant
vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Over a six-year span beginning in December 2008, China has contributed over ten thousand navy personnel in nearly
twenty task forces. In nearly eight hundred groups, these forces have escorted
over six thousand Chinese and foreign commercial vessels and have “protected
and helped over 60” of them.6 As the PLAN’s commander, Admiral Wu Shengli,
informed one of the authors, the mission has achieved “two ‘100 percents’ [两个
百分之百]: providing 100 percent security to all ships under escort, while ensuring PLAN forces’ own security 100 percent.”7
Although it is uncertain how many task forces will be deployed and for how
long, China’s presence in the Gulf of Aden has extended through 2014, and the
PLAN appears almost certain to continue efforts through 2015;8 it will likely
persist for still longer if the United Nations further extends its mandate for navies to fight piracy off Somalia.9 The probability of this is arguably even higher
following the announcement in late 2014 that East Asian rival Japan’s Maritime
Self-Defense Force will soon take command of a major international antipiracy
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6
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coalition. While Admiral Wu acknowledges that new piracy challenges have
emerged in the Gulf of Guinea, “a concerning trend for all world navies,” he nevertheless maintains, “As long as Gulf of Aden pirate activities continue, so too will
the escort missions of international navies.” Six years ago, under United Nations
authorization, China began to dispatch antipiracy task forces to the Gulf of Aden.
At the beginning, China planned for only one year of antipiracy operations. This
period was then extended for another year, and another, and so on. “So far,” Wu
declared, “there is no end in sight for the mission.”10
China’s naval antipiracy mission represents an unprecedented instance of
conduct by the PLAN of sustained long-distance operations. It provides a rare
window through which outside observers can see how the naval component of
China’s “going out” strategy transects economic, political, and strategic dimensions. While many of China’s other maritime activities damage its international
image, antipiracy operations in the far seas project soft power and a constructive
image. Likely in part because of this positive publicity potential, Beijing has distributed copious details on its antipiracy operations via official media, including
in English.11
The Chinese navy’s antipiracy missions provide much-needed support for
Chinese overseas interests. But the PLAN has also crafted its antipiracy missions
to portray blue-water operations positively abroad. Increasingly, the PLAN’s
antipiracy mandate is oriented toward broader international security objectives.
Commercial escort statistics exemplify this trend: initially China’s navy was only
allowed to escort Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but now in
some cases over 70 percent of ships in given Chinese escort flotillas have been
foreign flagged. Similarly, to secure the maritime commons Chinese commanding officers and sailors serving off Somalia have worked increasingly in the
framework of bilateral exchanges with other navies as well as in multistakeholder
settings.
This article explores the soft-power dimension of China’s far-seas antipiracy
operations. It addresses the extent to which Gulf of Aden deployments might
increase the PLAN’s prospects for cooperation with other navies and also the
impact of these missions on the role the navy plays within China’s larger diplomacy. Finally, it assesses how these deployments might shape future Chinese
naval development.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A sharp increase in piracy attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with
China’s foreign trade. Several well-publicized pirate attacks prior to the PLAN’s
antipiracy deployment in 2008 demonstrated Chinese vulnerability. Tianyu 8, a
fishing boat with twenty-four crewmen; the Chinese tanker Zhenhua 4; and the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

3

74

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 1, Art. 6

Sinotrans-owned cargo ship Dajian—as well as two Hong Kong–registered ships,
Stolt Valor and Delight—were all pirated prior to the PLAN’s deployment.12 Over
1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven
months of 2008, and of this number eighty-three were attacked by pirate groups.
Direct threats to China’s economic interests and citizens abroad were thus important drivers of the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment.
As the PLAN’s initial deployment prepared to set sail in December 2008,
Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, Ministry of National Defense secondary spokesman and deputy director of the ministry’s Information Office, convened a news
conference in which he clarified the points that, first, the mission’s primary
objective was to protect Chinese shipping interests, and that, second, it did not
represent a change in Chinese foreign policy or a desire to project greater bluewater naval capabilities.13 Idealistic and realistic interpretations of China’s antipiracy operations differ greatly. The former focuses on China’s desire to contribute
meaningfully to regional and international security, while the latter includes a
“desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide
opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities in
military operations other than war.”14
In line with the realists, economic interests in the Gulf of Aden had perhaps
the greatest impact on pragmatic Chinese policy makers. As Foreign Ministry
spokesman Liu Jianchao explains, “Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the seas. . . . That’s why we decided to send naval ships
to crack down.”15 China’s overseas maritime trade is highly dependent on vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs), such as the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of
Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Singapore, and South China
Sea. China currently relies on just five SLOCs for roughly 90 percent of its overseas trade. In particular, approximately 60 percent of all commercial vessels that
transit through the Strait of Malacca are Chinese flagged.16
For China, therefore, the economic benefits of protecting its international
trade are abundantly clear. China’s leadership continues to emphasize the PLAN’s
imperative to secure Chinese overseas maritime interests. Specifically, energy
supplies transported via international SLOCs will constitute a larger percentage
of China’s aggregate energy consumption. Having become a net oil importer in
1993, for example, China now relies on seaborne oil imports for over 40 percent
of its oil consumption.17 China’s oil import dependence will rise substantially
between now and 2030, by some estimates to as high as 80 percent.18
Oil and other energy imports constitute just one of many sectors in China that
face growing dependence on the sea. China Daily reported that as early as 2006,
maritime industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output, nearly 10
percent of China’s gross domestic product.19 In 2009, over 260 companies, across
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6
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various industries, reportedly engaged in international maritime shipping.20
In 2010 it was reported that each year over two thousand Chinese commercial
vessels were transiting the Gulf of Aden.21 In 2011, more than two years after
the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment, a professor at China’s National Defense
University observed, “From the current situation, ocean lifelines have already
become a soft rib in China’s strategic security.”22
China’s growth as a sea power has been rapid. It currently has more seafarers,
deep-sea fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation. It has become,
in the words of Ju Chengzhi, of the Ministry of Transport, a “great maritime
shipping power” (海运大国). In 2009 China’s merchant maritime fleet reportedly consisted of over 3,300 vessels and forty thousand crewmen.23 People’s Daily
reported in 2011 that China surpassed South Korea as the world’s largest shipbuilder in terms of capacity and new orders.24 China’s maritime responsibilities
are huge, since it has thirty-two thousand kilometers of coastline and claims over
three million square kilometers of offshore waters.25
Public awareness of the importance of maritime issues is increasing. In 2008,
two Chinese media outlets reported separate public surveys in which 86 percent
and 91 percent of Chinese citizens polled supported the PLAN’s antipiracy deployment.26 Simultaneously, many Chinese “netizens” (frequent Internet users)
criticized their government for its inability to ensure Chinese sailors’ safety.27
Domestically, in the period before deployments began Beijing thus faced strong
political incentives to intervene decisively to protect its shipping.
These political concerns at home paralleled international expectations. Such
deployments, it was predicted, would enhance China’s image as a “responsible
stakeholder” in international society, particularly in the domain of maritime
security.28 In the years since, China’s antipiracy operations have already aided the
PLAN substantially in developing its blue-water capacity.
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND BLUE-WATER ASPIRATIONS
Beijing’s deployment of PLAN antipiracy forces appears to be spurring on Chinese military development. As the Chinese newspaper Global Times puts it, over
five years of deployments to the Gulf of Aden have transformed PLAN antipiracy
forces from “maritime rookies to confident sea dogs.”29 Since China has not fought
an actual war since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, this experience of maintaining
multiyear, distant deployments of warships is extremely valuable.30 It has brought
PLAN vessels into what previously were—for China—literally uncharted waters.
China’s Navy Press has had to perform “nautical chart support tasks” for the Gulf
of Aden missions.31 In 2011, a PLAN senior captain effectively summarized the
multidimensional benefits of distant sea antipiracy operations: “The experience
definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers and sailors, but also for
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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the durability and function of the ships.”32 Some of the PLAN’s most advanced
ships and personnel have gained valuable experience in the Gulf of Aden, and
officers serving with distinction there have enjoyed subsequent promotions.33
Furthermore, antipiracy operations have positioned the PLAN as China’s most
active service. By proving its effectiveness against threats to Chinese overseas
interests, the PLAN has ensured that it will continue to procure some of the military’s newest and best technology.34 More broadly, the persistent threat of piracy
in international waters has enabled China to expand its far-seas security operations under the umbrella of benign international cooperation.35
Close analysis of PLAN antipiracy activities reveals four primary conduits for
projecting soft power: the escort of commercial ships and other direct operational aspects of PLAN antipiracy missions; navy-to-navy meetings, combined
training, and other exchanges and instances of cooperation with foreign navies;
participation in multistakeholder dialogues on land and at sea related to international antipiracy operations; and, perhaps most significantly, a growing number
of port visits conducted by PLAN warships for replenishment and diplomatic
purposes before, during, and after service in the Gulf of Aden. Exploiting these
channels has positioned the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in
China’s comprehensive quest for international soft power.
Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have primarily included area patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection.36 Wang Yongxiang,
deputy commander of the tenth escort task force, explains that specific tactics
depend on multiple idiosyncratic factors: “the schedules of the merchant vessels
to be escorted, their characteristics, and how well our warships have rested. We
want to not only ensure the safety of our charges, but also improve the efficiency
of escort protection.”37 Area patrol—monitoring certain maritime zones in and
around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed by the PLAN. When
China’s navy does engage in area patrols, it typically maintains two base points
550–600 nautical miles apart—for example, one a hundred nautical miles north
of Yemen’s Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of
Aden Harbor.38 On a normal mission PLAN vessels travel between these points,
typically taking two to three days to do so.39
Of all the services provided by China’s antipiracy forces, the escort of civilian
ships is the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in
the Gulf of Aden. Task forces consist of two warships, usually a combination of
destroyers and frigates. They are typically accompanied by either a replenishment
or landing ship. However, since the first task force, two or more warships concurrently stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led separate flotillas of merchant ships,
sometimes in opposite directions, through an area west of longitude fifty-seven
east and south of latitude fifteen north.40
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6
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PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008. As a 2010 Liberation Army Daily article states, “From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th
ship the Chinese naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the
2,000th ship used over 220 days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only
used over 180 days’ time.”41 As early as 2011, approximately 70 percent of ships
escorted by China’s navy at any given time were foreign.42 In terms of aggregate
escorts over the first four years, roughly 50 percent of PLAN-escorted commercial vessels were foreign flagged.43 People’s Navy reported in mid-2011 that China
had provided escort services to ships from over fifty foreign countries, and this
figure has likely increased over the past three-plus years.44 People’s Daily emphasizes that escort services are provided gratis for Chinese and foreign commercial
ships.45 That is, PLAN escort services are being provided as a complimentary
public good to the international community.
Foreign civilian ships can apply online to join a PLAN escort convoy via the
China Shipowners’ Association website. Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general
of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has asserted, “China
shoulders responsibility for foreign vessels based on growing national strength
and a friendly policy”; many other states do not send escort forces, because of
limited interest and the enormous costs. In Zhai’s opinion, “such international
cooperation and exchanges also help the rest of the world to know more about
China and accept it.”46
Given the international context in which China’s antipiracy operations take
place, the PLAN has taken steps to professionalize its services. For example, the
use of the English language is important while conducting international operations; the twelfth task force had an on-duty translator on board the frigate Yiyang
to liaise with foreign naval and merchant counterparts.47 Each PLAN task-force
member receives four “pocket books” covering the psychological aspects of deployment, security, international law, and the application of international law to
military operations. Also, naval officers specializing in international law provide
full-time legal support to officers and crews in meetings with ships of other nations.48 These efforts have assisted China’s internavy exchanges.
INTERNAVY EXCHANGES AND DIALOGUES AT SEA
Chinese and international commentators greatly value the unprecedented exposure of PLAN vessels and crews to foreign navies.49 Rear Admiral Michael
McDevitt, USN (Ret.), articulates the historical significance of the PLAN’s deployments in this way: “In terms of international engagement, the first decade of
the 21st century should be divided into a pre–anti-piracy operations period and
a post-anti-piracy period, because once the PLAN began to conduct anti-piracy
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operations, the entire nature of its approach to international naval engagement
changed appreciably.”50
The missions have had an undeniable impact on Chinese naval diplomacy;
interaction with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 is now routine in the Gulf
of Aden and adjacent waterways. In just a few of countless examples, in 2011 Han
Xiaohu, commander of China’s eighth escort task force, visited in March the flagship, a frigate, of NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD; in May, hosted the Singapore
navy’s Rear Admiral Harris Chan, then commander of U.S.-led Combined Task
Force (CTF) 151, on a PLAN warship; and in June hosted the European Union
Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) commander on board the frigate Wenzhou.51 The
PLAN and Singapore navy conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010
in the Gulf of Aden, sending personnel on board each other’s ships.52 A similar
exchange occurred in those waters in June 2014.53 China’s navy conducted additional exchanges with CTF-151 in July 2012 and with NATO in April and July
2012.54 An article in People’s Daily stated in 2012 that Chinese naval escort task
forces continue to inform the outside world about the “activities of suspicious
ships through network mailbox and radio station every day and shared information resources with 50-odd warships of 20-plus countries and organizations.”55 In
July 2014, the PLAN’s seventeenth escort task force conducted the VENUS NO. 2
joint antipiracy exercise with EU Combined Task Force 465 in the western Gulf of
Aden. The guided-missile destroyer Changchun, the comprehensive supply ship
Chaohu, and a Z-9 shipborne helicopter participated in task-force maneuvering,
maritime replenishment, flashing-light signaling, and main gun antiship firing
drills.56
China’s naval diplomacy in the region goes well beyond shipboard interactions
with Western antipiracy forces. For example, PLAN task forces off the Horn of
Africa have also been active in a variety of bilateral exchanges. The PLAN and
the Russian navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October
2009, during the PEACE BLUE SHIELD 2009 (平蓝盾—2009) exercise.57 Similarly,
China’s navy held extensive joint exercises with Russian navy BLUE SHIELD units
in May 2011 and conducted similar antipiracy joint exercises in both 2012 and
2013.58 Amid comprehensive Sino-Russian joint maritime exercises in 2012, Chinese and Russian naval forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue
joint training off the coast of Qingdao.59
The Chinese navy is not interacting only with large navies. During November
2009, PLAN military officials met with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship
inspections and exchanges, and during 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with
South Korean naval units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden.60 In 2012,
China and South Korea conducted joint antipiracy exercises in which helicopters of the two sides landed on each other’s warships for the first time.61 In April
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6

8

Erickson and Strange: China’s Blue Soft Power

ERICKSON & STRANGE

79

2011, China’s eighth escort task force sent Wenzhou and Qiandaohu to conduct
joint antipiracy exercises with the Pakistani guided-missile destroyer Khyber.62
These combined drills followed the Pakistani-hosted PEACE 11 multinational
maritime exercises, which included naval ships from, among other states, China,
the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Pakistan. China sent guided-missile
frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan, two helicopters, and seventy special forces
commandos.63 More recently the PLAN conducted joint antipiracy training with
the Ukrainian navy in the Gulf of Aden. All of these efforts support China’s growing naval diplomacy.
CHINESE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
At-sea engagements with other navies are crucial for establishing a positive image
of China’s growing global maritime presence. These engagements are complemented by a growing focus by the PLAN on establishing effective relationships
with littoral states in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, since
2008 the nature and scope of Chinese naval visits have expanded continuously.
Growing port calls bolster China’s far-seas soft-power projection by facilitating
interaction and dialogue between China and the many countries whose ports and
geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these relationships.
The PLAN is increasing port visits (see the table) as its far-seas antipiracy
presence matures. A small sample reveals the dynamism with which the PLAN
is engaging the navies, governments, and citizens of littoral states in connection with its antipiracy missions. For example, during September 2012, Yiyang
of the twelfth escort task force arrived in Karachi for a second cycle of rest and
replenishment, during which it held seminars and other exchanges with Pakistani
naval counterparts.64 Later that year Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming and members
from the twelfth escort task force met with Commodore Jonathan Mead, acting
commander of the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official visit. The Australian
chief of navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, remarked, “I welcome the continued opportunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange lessons
learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations.”65 More recently, in late 2013
the fifteenth escort task force, in addition to holding friendly exchanges with
fleets from the EU, United States, and NATO, docked for friendly visits in Tanzania, Kenya, and Sri Lanka.66 The sixteenth task force conducted antipiracy duties
and dispatched the guided-missile frigate Yancheng to escort Syrian chemical
weapons to their destruction;67 it then “paid consecutive visits to eight African
countries for the first time.”68 It conducted antipiracy exercises with the navies of
several of those countries, including Cameroon, Namibia, and Nigeria.69
Clearly, uninterrupted operations in the Gulf of Aden have helped to facilitate
PLAN maritime engagement with other countries in the vicinity as well as those
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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strategically situated on the route from China to Somali waters. China has effectively increased the role of naval diplomacy as a component of its antipiracy
deployments in a number of world regions. People’s Daily reports that “since
the 2nd Chinese naval escort task force, the Chinese navy has established a new
mechanism of organizing escort warships to pay friendly visits to foreign countries, and the Chinese naval escort task forces have successfully paid friendly visits to more than 20 countries, such as India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Singapore.”70
Whereas in all of 2009, PLAN task forces berthed in foreign ports in just
five states, Chinese antipiracy flotillas have, among them, stopped in over ten
countries every year since 2010. Moreover, the nature of port calls has evolved
dramatically during the past six years. In 2009 and 2010 most Chinese port calls
were conducted for replenishment, rest, and relaxation. But by 2012 Chinese
antipiracy escort task forces had begun making several port calls for friendly
visits (i.e., goodwill exchanges with diplomatic elements) before, during, and
after their service in the Gulf of Aden. This trend has continued over the last two
years and demonstrates a growing share of Chinese naval resources devoted to
diplomacy. More importantly, it illustrates the efficiency with which the PLAN
is deriving soft-power capital from its contributions to international maritime
nontraditional security.
China has also bolstered international exchanges by hosting foreign navies at
Chinese ports and cities. In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives
from eight African nations, including Algeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, to participate in a twenty-day maritime law enforcement program in Zhejiang Province.71
At the first International Symposium on Counter-Piracy and Escort Cooperation, in February 2012 at the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, Navy Military
Studies Research Institute senior researcher Cai Weidong stated, “The Chinese
navy hopes to build up a platform for international cooperation that will allow
naval forces of different countries to familiarize themselves with each other. I
hope the platform well serves our antipiracy goals.”72
As these examples illustrate, China has derived incrementally greater softpower benefits from its antipiracy operations by boosting the number of both
midmission port calls and goodwill visits en route home. Chinese scholar Wang
Yizhou has called for a higher degree of “creative involvement,” a foreign policy
concept that identifies and adapts creative and flexible modes of foreign engagement on a case-by-case basis.73 The PLAN seems to be applying Wang’s concept
in the far seas, perhaps most notably through its antipiracy operations, without
changing their fundamental form. Adding more stops before and after antipiracy
service in the Gulf of Aden has allowed the PLAN to accumulate larger soft-power
gains. This practice reflects the PLAN’s greatest lesson from far-seas antipiracy
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6
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SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES
ALGERIA
Algiers
• 2–5 April 2013, friendly visit
AUSTRALIA
Sydney
• 18–22 December 2012, friendly
visit
BAHRAIN
Manama
• 9–13 December 2010, friendly
visit
BULGARIA
Varna
• 6–10 August 2012, friendly visit
BURMA
Rangoon
• 29 August–2 September 2010,
friendly visit
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
• 24 January 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 3 May 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 13 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 22 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 24 December 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 21 February 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 5 October 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 24–29 March 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 14 May 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 13–18 August 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 1–6 December 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 6–8 June 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 28 July 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 7–9 October 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 22–26 February 2014,
replenish/overhaul

• 1–5 April 2014, replenish/
overhaul and friendly visit
EGYPT
Alexandria
• 26–30 July 2010, friendly visit
FRANCE
Toulon
• 23–27 April 2013, friendly visit
GREECE
Crete
• 7 March 2011, replenish/
overhaul
Piraeus
• 9–13 August 2013, friendly visit
INDIA
Cochin
• 8 August 2009, friendly visit
ISRAEL
Haifa
• 14–17 August 2012, friendly visit
ITALY
Taranto
• 2–7 August 2010, joint drills and
friendly visit
KENYA
Mombasa
• 2–5 January 2014, friendly
visit
KUWAIT
Shuwaikh
• 27 November–1 December 2011,
friendly visit
MALAYSIA
Port Kelang
• 6 December 2009, friendly visit
MALTA
• 26–30 March 2013, friendly visit
MOROCCO
Casablanca
• 9–13 April 2013, friendly visit
MOZAMBIQUE
Maputo
• 29 March–2 April 2012,
friendly visit
OMAN
Masqat
• 1–8 December 2011, friendly visit
Salalah
• 21 June–1 July 2009, replenish/
overhaul

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

• 14 August 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 2 January 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 1 April 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 8 June 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 10 August 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 8 January 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 19 January 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 10 April 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 8–11 June 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 23 June 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 7–10 November 2011,
replenish/overhaul
• 21–24 February 2012,
replenish/overhaul
• 1–3 July 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 9 July 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 28–29 March 2013, replenish/
overhaul
PAKISTAN
Karachi
• 5–8 August 2009, joint drills and
friendly visit
• 7–13 March 2010, joint drills and
friendly visit
• 13 March 2011, joint drills
• 8 September 2012, replenish/
overhaul
PHILIPPINES
Manila
• 13–17 April 2010, friendly visit
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
• 15–19 April 2013, friendly visit
QATAR
Doha
• 2–7 August 2011, friendly visit
ROMANIA
Constanţa
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly
visit
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SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES CONTINUED
SAUDI ARABIA
Jidda
• 27 November–1 December 2010,
friendly visit
• 3 September 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 17 June 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 1–6 January 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 5–28 April 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 14–18 September 2013,
replenish/overhaul
• 2–6 November 2013,
replenish/overhaul
SEYCHELLES
Port Victoria
• 14 April 2011, friendly visit
• 16–20 June 2013, friendly visit
SINGAPORE
Changi
• 5–7 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul and joint drills
• 18–20 December 2011, replenish/
overhaul and friendly visit
• 5–10 September 2013, friendly
visit

SOUTH AFRICA
Durban
• 4–8 April 2011, friendly visit
SRI LANKA
Colombo
• 5–7 January 2010, friendly visit
• 7–12 December 2010, friendly
visit
Trincomalee
• 13–15 January 2014, friendly visit
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
• 26–30 March 2011, joint drills
and friendly visit
• 29 December 2013–1 January
2014, friendly visit
THAILAND
Sattahip
• 16–21 August 2011, joint drills
and friendly visit
• 21–25 April 2012, friendly visit
• 12–16 September 2013, friendly
visit
TURKEY
Istanbul
• 5–8 August 2012, friendly visit

UKRAINE
Sevastopol
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly
visit
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi
• 24–28 March 2010, friendly visit
VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh City
• 13 January 2013, friendly visit
YEMEN
Aden
• 21 February 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 25 April 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 23 July 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 28 September 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 5 February 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 16 May 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 26 July 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 1 October 2010, replenish/
overhaul

missions: there is no substitute for experience, and six years of continuous operations have allowed China gradually to become more effective in securing its
comprehensive interests through the deployment of antipiracy task forces.74
Arguably even more than foreign port calls, other nontraditional maritime
security operations facilitated by Beijing’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy presence
contribute to China’s “blue soft power.” Escort of foreign vessels carrying Syrian
chemical weapons through the Mediterranean and active participation in search
and rescue operations during the frantic search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370
in early 2014 are just two examples of how the PLAN has leveraged antipiracy
resources to contribute to international security.75
Some commentators are less sanguine about China’s attempts to expand its
maritime relations; it is important to note that there are objections to the notion that China’s antipiracy missions are benign. In that view, self-interested
economic and security calculations are arguably the largest drivers of the PLAN’s
deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden, and viewing port visits as diplomatic exchanges risks oversimplification, since many states may view them as
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6
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harbingers of creeping Chinese power projection.76 For example, the tiny islandstate Seychelles is one of several coastal and island African states in which China
has actively sought to enhance its soft power.77 China could be using antipiracy
operations to support an expansive naval development policy, as well as to pursue
a more active grand strategy that involves overseas access facilities and a longterm trend toward a greater overall global presence.
CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
The PLAN is just one of several “independent” providers of antipiracy assets in
the Gulf of Aden. While the majority of naval antipiracy forces fight pirates under
the aegis of multilateral commands, several states—including China, India, Iran,
Japan, Malaysia, and Russia—have primarily operated on a unilateral basis rather
than under the command of multinational antipiracy forces such as CTF-151,
NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD, or EU NAVFOR. This posture suggests that
China is trying to learn as much as it can from other navies without revealing
much about its own operations, while also, clearly, maintaining ideological independence in foreign policy.
China’s preference to abstain from combined operations is driven by several
factors. First, greater independence allows the PLAN to conduct its preferred
method of antipiracy operations—relatively low-risk escort operations aimed at
deterring, rather than actively searching for, pirates. It also offers China an individual identity as a provider of maritime public goods, rather than as just another
state operating within Western-led security mechanisms. Moreover, if China
joined the existing security structure, potential frictions might arise that would
preclude meaningful integration, such as sensitivities related to information
sharing and technology theft. Some Western defense experts have questioned the
U.S. Navy’s invitation for the PLAN to participate in the historic 2014 RIMPAC
exercises and other joint maritime cooperation activities for such reasons.78
These concerns notwithstanding, China’s antipiracy operations over the past
several years have made meaningful contributions to Gulf of Aden security. In
addition, they have achieved unprecedented coordination between China and
other antipiracy maritime forces in the region, such as those of the United States.
While suspicions abound regarding China’s motives, antipiracy cooperation may
contribute to more positive outside perceptions of China and its international
status. China has been “ready to exchange information and cooperate with the
warships of other countries in fighting Somalian pirates” since its inaugural deployment in 2008.79 One PLAN antipiracy task force commander, Admiral Du
Jingcheng, has recalled that he was eager to “facilitate exchanges of information
with escort naval vessels from other countries.”80
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In the nearly six-year period beginning December 2008, the PLAN has coordinated information with over twenty nations, including the United States.81
Li Faxin, associate professor (and lieutenant commander) at the Naval Marine
Corps College, states that PLAN antipiracy forces have established “high-trust
partner relations” (高度信任的伙伴关系) with many nations operating in the
Gulf of Aden.82
Positive results have also been facilitated by Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), a voluntary multistate antipiracy information-sharing mechanism. SHADE meetings occur quarterly in Bahrain and regularly host naval and
industry leaders from various states. Willingness on the part of independent navies, China’s in particular, to synchronize their antipiracy operations with those
of Western forces within the SHADE mechanism is a historic achievement for
twenty-first-century maritime commons governance.
China was denied SHADE chairmanship in 2009 but, notwithstanding, coordinates its antipiracy escorts with those of other SHADE members. For example,
China has participated in SHADE’s Convoy Coordination Working Group and
coordinates its monthly escort schedules with other navies providing independent escorts. China, India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their antipiracy operations as early as 2011.83 They mutually arranged escort schedules
twenty-nine times between January and March 2012, with China acting as the
coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and Japan for nine.84
For six years the PLAN’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have symbolized China’s burgeoning out-of-area naval activity. They also showcase Beijing’s
growing ability to achieve soft-power objectives while concurrently promoting
its overseas interests and military development. Important components of these
missions include escort of commercial ships, navy-to-navy meetings, participation in multistakeholder dialogues on antipiracy operations, and, most significantly, the growing number of port visits undertaken by PLAN warships. These
position the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in China’s recent
soft-power diplomacy.
China’s ongoing antipiracy operations in the far seas have generated many
positive assessments. In contrast to the contentious near seas, where Beijing is
consistently embroiled in sovereignty disputes that show no signs of abating,
antipiracy missions represent the most significant positive component of China’s
naval engagement to date, particularly with regard to the degree to which Chinese vessels and sailors are interacting with the outside world. This interaction
not only enhances China’s maritime image in the eyes of its antipiracy partners
but may help alleviate fears that China’s naval rise might one day threaten twentyfirst-century maritime prosperity in regions beyond the near seas. The United
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/6
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States and China reportedly planned over forty visits, exchanges, and other engagements for 2013, double the number in the previous year, and successfully carried out joint antipiracy exercises in 2012 and 2013.85 In July–August 2014, China
participated in RIMPAC for the first time, the U.S.-hosted forum that is currently
the largest naval exercise in the world.86 There, four PLAN vessels drilled with
international counterparts off Hawaii, on such subjects as antipiracy.87
China has received well-deserved credit for helping to reduce piracy dramatically in the Gulf of Aden. In 2007–2008, as Admiral Wu told one of the authors,
the area suffered about a hundred pirate attacks annually, of which between fifty
and sixty “hijackings” (piratings) were successful. In 2014, by contrast, there were
only seventeen attacks through September, none successful. China’s contribution entailed “major costs in forces, human resources, and money.” Admiral Wu
continued, “The U.S. Navy and other top-level U.S. leaders are very happy that
this is continuing. They are satisfied that China expends significant resources to
make a contribution,” thereby reducing the resource burden on the United States.
“There are just some members of Congress who remain opposed to the missions.”
Admiral Wu added that he wants to invite U.S. congressional representatives to
PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden.88
The PLAN’s experience fighting piracy in distant seas is thus a benchmark
that can be used by Beijing to cement its positive image in the international
arena. Antipiracy operations prove that the PLAN can be a provider—not merely
a consumer or, worse, a disrupter—of maritime commons security. International society largely perceives Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy as
positive developments, perceptions that stand in sharp contrast to China’s hardpower naval approaches in the East and South China Seas. Scholars constantly
scrutinize the nature and perceived efficacy of China’s soft power.89 While it is
too early to speculate exactly how Beijing’s contributions to antipiracy today will
bolster its future soft-power influence, the results should be at least moderately
positive. More generally, the Gulf of Aden case suggests that China will continue
to reap international political benefits commensurate with its contributions to
international maritime security.

NOTES
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